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Justice Blackmun's Mark on Criminal
Law and Procedure
by Krr KiNPORTS*
When Justice Blackmun was nominated to the Court in 1970,
Americans were consumed with the idea of crime control. In the 1968
presidential campaign, Richard Nixon had called the Supreme Court
"'soft on crime"' and had promised to "put 'law and order' judges on
the Court."' While sitting on the Eighth Circuit, the Justice had "sel-
dom struck down searches, seizures, arrests or confessions," and most
of his opinions in criminal cases had "affirmed guilty verdicts and
sentences."' Thus, according to one commentator, Justice Blackmun
seemed to be "exactly what Nixon was looking for: a judge who be-
lieved in judicial restraint, was strong on law and order, and weak on
civil liberties."3
During the Justice's twenty-four years on the Supreme Court, his
colleagues-under the leadership of Chief Justices Burger and Rehn-
quist-narrowly interpreted and even overruled outright a number of
the Warren Court's pro-defendant rulings. Despite initial predictions
about Justice Blackmun's views on criminal issues and the general ten-
dency of Supreme Court Justices to remain loyal to the policies of the
President who nominated them,4 the Justice would eventually be
* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1976, Brown University;
J.D. 1980, University of Pennsylvania. Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun, October Term,
1981. I am very grateful to Michelle Hugghis for her research assistance in connection with
this article.
1. David G. Savage, Civil Rights, Pro-Police Rulings-High Court Dichotomy: Lib-
eral & Conservative, L.A. Tn4Es, May 13, 1987, at 1; see also Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331, 2351 (1993) (noting that "Richard Nixon gained the
White House by running as much against the Court as against his rival").
2. Donald Lay, The Cases of Blackmun, J. on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit 1959-1970, 8 HAmLrN L. Rnv. 2, 15-16 (1985).
3. Jeffery M. Shaman, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: The Evolution of a Realist, 72
A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (1986).
4. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE CoURT 50 (1985) ("For
the most part, and especially in areas of particular and known concern to a President,
Justices have been loyal to the ideals and perspectives of the men who have nominated
them.").
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called a "swing Justice"' and "a voice of reason"'6 in criminal cases.
The Justice himself, on the other hand, is fond of saying that his views
never shifted, but that it was the Court that changed around him.7 In
attempting to evaluate these various characterizations and to describe
the Justice's mark on criminal law and procedure, I first examine the
Justice's judicial personality, as reflected in his criminal law opinions,
and then turn to the role he played in the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts' efforts to restrict the rights afforded criminal defendants.8
I. The Justice's Judicial Personality
Justice Blackmun's extraordinary-and endearing-humility has
been the subject of extensive commentary.9 Likewise, much has been
written about the careful attention the Justice gave to the specific facts
of each case and his concern for the real-world impact of the Court's
decisions.10 Not surprisingly, these traits are evident in his criminal
writings as well.
The Justice's opinions in criminal cases often go beyond a discus-
sion of the abstract legal rule at issue and emphasize the practical ef-
fect the decision is likely to have on the parties and others affected by
the Court's ruling. Perhaps the most widely cited illustration in the
criminal law context is the Justice's dissenting opinion in United States
v. Bailey." Disagreeing with the majority's holding that defendants
5. Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three
Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE
SuREmlE COURT 143, 167 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
6. Linda Greenhouse, A Capacity to Change as Well as to Challenge, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1994, at E4.
7. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Blackmun, Author of Abortion Rights, Dies, N.Y.
TMEs, Mar. 5, 1999, at Al.
8. My discussion is limited to the Justice's opinions in non-capital cases. For a de-
scription of his death penalty jurisprudence, see Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun's
Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1998).
9. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and
the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLiNTE L. Rev. 51, 51 (1985) (referring to the Justice as
"notoriously humble and self-effacing"); John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice
Blackmun, N.Y. TvImES, Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (noting that "[t]he notion of
humility is central to an understanding of Justice Blackmun's place on the Court").
10. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 9, at 103 (observing that the Justice's equal protection
theory of aliens' rights "ensures... that the human concerns of resident aliens... will not
be overlooked"); Jenkins, supra note 9, at 20, 23 (describing the Justice as "a jurist deter-
mined to make the Court responsive.., to individuals," and quoting him as saying, "'I get
disturbed when we have a case that goes off on theory and does injustice to the litigant"');
Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARv. L. Rlv. 717, 736 (1983)
(noting that the Justice "emphasize[s] the human dimension in the cases confronting him").
11. 444 U.S. 394, 419 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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charged with the crime of escape are foreclosed from raising necessity
or duress defense unless they made "a bona fide effort to surrender or
return to custody... at their earliest opportunity,"'" the Justice's dis-
sent opens by noting that "[tihe atrocities and inhuman conditions of
prison life in America are almost unbelievable."' 3 In chilling detail,
he continues:
A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual
gang rape his first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the
van on the way to jail. Weaker inmates become the property of
stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell the sexual services of the
victim. Prison officials either are disinterested in stopping abuse
of prisoners by other prisoners or are incapable of doing so,
given the limited resources society allocates to the prison
system.
14
In a similar, though less dramatic, vein, the Justice's separate
opinion in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,'5 the case up-
holding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints, 6 called "the
slaughter on our highways" caused by drunk drivers a "tragic aspect of
American life."'1 7 When the Court held in Tate v. Short's that sentenc-
ing a defendant to prison rather than a fine because of her indigency
violates the Equal Protection Clause,' 9 the Justice wrote a concurring
opinion, warning that the effect of the Court's ruling might be to en-
courage legislatures to abolish fines as a sentencing option for many
traffic offenses. 20
And, finally, while the Justice joined the majority opinion adopt-
ing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v.
Leon,2' he wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing the "provisional"
nature of the Court's "empirical judgment" that the exclusionary rule
has "little appreciable effect" in cases where police officers conduct a
search in reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant:
By their very nature, the assumptions on which we proceed to-
day cannot be cast in stone. To the contrary, they now will be
tested in the real world of state and federal law enforcement,
and this Court will attend to the results. If it should emerge
12. Iat at 415 (majority opinion).
13. Id. at 421 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15. 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. See id at 455 (majority opinion).
17. Id. at 456-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
18. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
19. See id. at 398.
20. See id- at 401 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
21. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material
change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we
shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.22
The Justice's concurrence in Leon demonstrates not only his con-
cern for the real-world impact of the Court's decisions, but also his
humility. He was not afraid to admit that his judgment might be
wrong and might therefore need to be rethought. Another manifesta-
tion of this humble recognition of his own fallibility was the Justice's
refusal to join the other members of the Court in articulating broad
legal principles that were not absolutely necessary to the outcome of a
case. In United States v. Place,' for example, Justice Blackmun
agreed with the majority that a ninety-minute airport detention of the
defendant's luggage was unreasonable and therefore could not be jus-
tified as a Terry stop and frisk,24 but he refused to join the majority in
reaching out and deciding the constitutionality of using a specially
trained police dog to sniff the luggage in order to detect narcotics-an
issue that the defendant had not raised, that the lower courts had not
decided, and that the Supreme Court did not need to resolve.25 Like-
wise, he refused to join the majority opinion in Florida v. Wells26 be-
cause the Court went farther than he believed was necessary.
Although the Justice agreed with the majority that the inventory
search of a suitcase found in the trunk of the defendant's car was inva-
lid because Florida Highway Patrol policy gave officers complete dis-
cretion in deciding whether or not to open closed containers during an
inventory search, he refused to join the Court's opinion because it
went on to address the question of "precisely how much, if any, discre-
tion an individual policeman constitutionally may exercise."27 Simi-
larly, he wrote separately in Graham v. Connor,28 agreeing with the
majority that "the Fourth Amendment is the primary tool for analyz-
ing claims of excessive force in the prearrest context," but suggesting
that "the Court would have done better to leave ... for another day"
the question whether substantive due process has any applicability in
22. Id at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
24. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For further discussion of the stop-and-frisk
cases, see infra text accompanying notes 90-103.
25. See Place, 462 U.S. at 723 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
27. Id. at 10-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). For further discussion of
the inventory search cases, see infra text accompanying notes 143-48.
28. 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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such cases, given that the "petitioner apparently decided that it was in
his best interest to disavow the continued application of substantive
due process analysis" and his "litigation strategy ... cannot be ex-
pected to... serve other potential plaintiffs equally well. 29 And in
Colorado v. Connelly,3° the Justice declined to join the portion of the
Court's opinion discussing the standard of proof the prosecution must
satisfy in order to establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights because
that issue had not been raised or briefed by the parties and was not
necessary to the Court's decision.3'
Finally, the Justice's focus on the facts of each case and his reluc-
tance to issue unnecessarily broad rulings often drew him to conduct a
harmless error analysis in criminal cases. His criminal law opinions-
especially in his early years on the Court-often inquired into the
harmlessness of the error alleged by the defendant, requiring him to
delve into the facts of the case to an extent unusual for an opinion at
the Supreme Court level.32 In fact, the Justice's first opinion in a crim-
inal case-a concurrence in Dutton v. Evans33-- discussed why the
harmlessness of the error alleged by the prisoner was an additional
reason for reversing the lower court's order granting habeas relief.34
Likewise, his dissent in United States v. Tucker,35 where the Court held
that the defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial judge
had improperly considered two prior uncounseled felony convictions
in imposing sentence,36 was based on his assessment that the error was
harmless. Calling the Court's decision "an exercise in futility," the
Justice urged his colleagues to be "just a little realistic" and to realize
that the trial judge was likely to impose the same maximum sentence
on remand.37
29. Id at 399-400 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
30. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
31. See id at 171 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
For further discussion of Connelly, see infra text accompanying notes 229-30.
32. One commentator attributes this tendency to the Justice's lengthy tenure on the
appellate court. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from
"Minnesota Twin" to Independent Voice, in THE BURGER COURT POLmriCAL AND JUDI-
ciAL PROm.s 63, 66 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).
33. 400 U.S. 74, 90 (1970) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 90-93 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
36. See id. at 448-49.
37. Id. at 452 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62,77-
81 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (refusing to
consider the question whether the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of codefend-
ants' interlocking confessions because any error made in admitting the confessions was
harmless); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 99 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
the majority that it was improper for the trial judge to make threatening remarks to a
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Thus, the Justice's criminal jurisprudence reflected the judicial
personality that was also evident in other cases-his humility, his re-
fusal to ignore the facts of a case, and his concern for the practical
impact of the Court's decisions. I turn next to consider this jurispru-
dence and judicial personality in the context of analyzing the extent to
which the Justice participated in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
narrowing of the rights afforded criminal defendants.
H. The Justice's Role in the Constriction of
Defendants' Rights
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' hostile treatment of the War-
ren Court's criminal law precedents has received a good deal of atten-
tion. 8 In analyzing Justice Blackmun's position on the Court's efforts
to undo the work of its predecessor, I address the Court's opinions in
the following areas: search and seizure, confessions, the right to coun-
sel, habeas corpus, and the right to a jury trial.
A. The Search and Seizure Cases
In some respects, one could say that Justice Blackmun's approach
in Fourth Amendment cases remained true to the "law and order"
platform on which President Nixon nominated him.39 In other re-
spects, however, his views on search and seizure questions cannot be
so easily categorized. In analyzing his contribution to this area of the
law, I consider his views on the exclusionary rule, the definition of a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, other limits on the scope
of the Fourth Amendment, and the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.
1. The Exclusionary Rule
Justice Blackmun was not yet on the Court when it held in Mapp
v. Ohio4 ° that the states are obligated to apply the exclusionary rule,41
and he indicated early in his tenure on the Court that he did not be-
lieve the exclusionary rule was constitutionally required. "[T]he
defense witness, but concluding that there was insufficient evidence of prejudice given "the
backdrop of... apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt").
38. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 748 (1987); Kamisar, supra note 5; Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal
Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA LJ. 1 (1995).
39. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
40. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. See id. at 655.
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Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary rule,"'42 he wrote in dis-
sent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. Although he exhibited some hes-
itancy in agreeing to create a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule,43 his concurring opinion in Leon made clear that he "share[d] the
[majority's] view that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally
compelled corollary of the Fourth Amendment itself."'  And he
joined the majority in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in a
grand jury proceeding,' a taxpayer's federal civil suit seeking a refund
of money that had been illegally seized by the state police,46 and a
civil deportation hearing.4 7 In fact, he wrote for the Court in the tax-
payer case, United States v. Janis, referring to the exclusionary rule as
a "comparatively late judicial creation"48 and concluding that "[t]here
comes a point at which courts... cannot continue to create barriers to
law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly
the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches."4 9
Although the Justice may not have believed that the exclusionary
rule was constitutionally required, he nevertheless viewed it as a criti-
cal tool for deterring unconstitutional police practices. His majority
opinion in Brown v. Illinois' warned that "the effect of the exclusion-
ary rule would be substantially diluted" and "the constitutional guar-
antee against unlawful searches and seizures [would] be reduced to 'a
form of words"' if Miranda warnings were deemed sufficient to purge
the taint of an invalid arrest.5 ' Likewise, he wrote the majority opin-
ion in Franks v. Delaware 2 -over the dissenting voices of Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Rehnquist-holding that defendants may
challenge the veracity of statements made in search warrant applica-
tions and that warrants must be invalidated if they are based on false
statements that were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for
the truth.53 The Justice's opinion in that case explained:
Despite the deep skepticism of Members of this Court as to the
wisdom of extending the exclusionary rule to collateral areas,
42. 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Black's dissent-
ing opinion).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
44. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354-55 (1974).
46. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976).
47. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984).
48. Janis, 428 U.S. at 443.
49. Id. at 459.
50. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
51. Id at 602-03 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)).
52. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
53. See id. at 155-56.
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such as civil or grand jury proceedings, the Court has not ques-
tioned, in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the contin-
ued application of the rule to suppress evidence from the State's
case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been substantial
and deliberate.54
In certain circumstances, therefore, the Justice was actively committed
to preserving the exclusionary rule.
2. The Definition of a "Search"
In Katz v. United States,55 the Warren Court defined a "search"
for Fourth Amendment purposes as encompassing any police activity
that intruded on the defendant's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."' 56 One of the ways in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have constricted Fourth Amendment rights is by taking "a narrow,
stingy view of what amounts to a 'search."' 57 Although Justice Black-
mun subscribed to this narrow view in some cases, in others he advo-
cated a broader definition of Fourth Amendment "searches."
On the one hand, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in
Smith v. Maryland,58 holding that the use of a pen register to record
the telephone numbers dialed from the defendant's home telephone
did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore did
not constitute a "sea;ch" governed by the Fourth Amendment.5 9 The
Justice's opinion for the Court reasoned that a pen register only has
"limited capabilities" 60 because it cannot reveal the contents of a con-
versation, and that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."'61 Nine years
later, the Justice joined the majority opinion in California v. Green-
wood,62 which reiterated these arguments in support of its holding
that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in gar-
bage he had placed in plastic bags on the curb.63
Nevertheless, the Justice refused to accept similar arguments in
several cases where prosecutors argued that aerial surveillance did not
54. Id at 171; see also id. at 169 (noting that "alternative sanctions" for impermissible
searches-such as civil suits, internal police disciplinary procedures, and perjury prosecu-
tions-are "not likely to fill the gap").
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. Kamisar, supra note 38, at 35.
58. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
59. See id. at 745-46.
60. Id. at 742.
61. Id. at 743-44.'
62. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
63. See id- at 41.
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constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In both California v. Ciraolo6 4 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,65 the Justice thought that the police surveillance qualified as a
search and therefore joined the dissenters. 66 He likewise wrote a dis-
senting opinion in Florida v. Riley,67 indicating that he would require
the prosecution to shoulder the burden of proving that the defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, given his suspicion that
"for most American communities it is a rare event when nonpolice
helicopters fly over one's curtilage at an altitude of 400 feet."6
3. Other Limits on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment
In other areas, Justice Blackmun was willing to impose limitations
on the reach of the Fourth Amendment. He joined the majority opin-
ion in Stone v. Powell,69 which precludes prisoners from raising Fourth
Amendment claims on habeas so long as they had a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate their claims in the state courts.70 The Justice was
likewise willing to impose standing requirements on defendants who
wish to raise Fourth Amendment claims,7 1 at times perhaps even
stricter standards than the majority would support.72 He also joined
the majority in Illinois v. Gates,73 which replaced the Warren Court's
64. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
65. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
66. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (Powell, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court's
holding that police did not conduct a search of defendant's fenced-in backyard when they
secured a private plane, flew over the yard at an altitude of 1,000 feet, and discovered
marijuana plants); Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 240 (Powell, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the Court's holding that EPA officials did not conduct a search when they flew over
large industrial complex and took photographs using a $22,000 precision aerial mapping
camera).
67. 488 U.S. 445, 467 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting from plurality's conclusion that
police did not conduct a search when they flew a helicopter over defendant's backyard at
an altitude of 400 feet and observed marijuana plants through openings in the roof of his
greenhouse).
69. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
70. See id. at 481-82.
71. The Justice joined the majority in both Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)
(holding that defendants were not entitled to move to suppress evidence found in a car in
which they had been passengers because they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the car), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (holding that defendant was not
entitled to challenge the search of his companion's purse, into which he had put his drugs,
because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse).
72. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,101 (1990) (dissenting without opinion in case
holding that defendant had standing to contest the entry into a home in which he was
staying as an overnight guest and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless
entry).
73. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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two-pronged test for ascertaining whether a tip satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement 74 with a looser totality-of-
the-circumstances approach that instructs magistrates to make "a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circum-
stances.... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."'75 And despite the reserva-
tions about creating a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
that he expressed in United States v. Leon,76 he authored the majority
opinion in Illinois v. Krull,77 extending Leon's good-faith exception to
apply where the police reasonably relied on a state statute authorizing
a warrantless search that was later determined to be
unconstitutional.7"
Notwithstanding these instances where Justice Blackmun will-
ingly imposed limits on the reach of the Fourth Amendment, he dis-
sented when the Court held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez7 9
that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to federal agents' search of
property that was owned by a nonresident alien and located in a for-
eign country.8 0 Although he agreed that the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement did not govern searches conducted outside this
country, he thought that the Amendment's reasonableness clause-
typically necessitating a finding of probable cause-did apply in cases
where "a foreign national is held accountable for purported violations
of United States criminal laws" and "was lawfully (though involunta-
rily) within this country at the time the search occurred."'"
4. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Justice Blackmun's record in cases creating and construing the
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is like-
wise difficult to categorize. Although, as detailed below, he supported
the creation of a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, he
74. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1969) (requiring proof that the
informant was both credible and had a reliable basis for the information provided to the
police); see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
75. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
76. 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying
notes 21-22.
77. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
78. See id. at 349-50. Here again, however, as in Leon, the Justice expressed a willing-
ness to "revise[ ]" his opinion "[i]f future empirical evidence ever should undermine [the]
assumption" on which it was based. Id. at 352 n.8.
79. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
80. See id. at 274-75.
81. Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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became uncomfortable with the Court's tendency to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless search simply by using a balancing test
to examine its reasonableness. Even though he had initially endorsed
the balancing test, 2 he expressed concern in his separate opinion in
United States v. Place3 with the "emerging tendency on the part of the
Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the
Fourth Amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable."'
"While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from un-
reasonable seizures," the Justice continued, "the Amendment does
not leave the reasonableness of most seizures to the judgment of
courts or government officers."8" Rather, the Justice noted, "the
Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and de-
cided that a seizure is reasonable only if supported by a judicial war-
rant based on probable cause."86 Only in those limited situations
where there is "'a special law enforcement need for greater flexibil-
ity,"' 8 7 the Justice warned, "is a court entitled to engage in any balanc-
ing of interests in determining the validity of a seizure."88 The Justice
would reiterate this warning on other occasions as well. 89
Thrning to some specific exceptions to the warrant requirement,
the Justice was not a member of the Court when Terry v. Ohio9 ° first
authorized a warrantless stop and frisk based on reasonable suspi-
cion,91 but he joined the majority in a number of cases extending the
authority of the police to conduct an investigatory stop and frisk. 2
82. As discussed supra in text accompanying notes 45-49, the Justice joined the major-
ity opinion in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974), which balanced the "po-
tential injury" caused by the exclusionary rule against its "potential benefits" in deciding
whether to extend the exclusionary rule to allow a grand jury witness to refuse to answer
questions based on an illegal search. The Justice then applied Calandra's balancing test in
his majority opinion in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976), concluding that
"exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal
enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the
conduct of the state police so that it outweighs the social costs imposed by the exclusion."
83. 462 U.S. 696, 720 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
84. Id. at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
85. Id. at 722 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
88. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741-42 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351-52 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
90. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
91. See id at 27.
92. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1991) (holding that fleeing
suspect had not been seized by police officer who was chasing him because the officer had
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Likewise, he dissented when the Court decided in Florida v. Royer93
that stopping a suspected drug courier in the airport and asking him to
accompany two detectives to a private police room approximately
forty feet away exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry stop.94
Given "the extraordinary and well-documented difficulty of identify-
ing drug couriers," the Justice concluded that "the minimal intrusion
in this case.., was eminently reasonable."95 Eight years later, how-
ever, he refused to join the majority's holding in Florida v. Bostick96
that a bus sweep-where two police officers boarded a bus at a sched-
uled stop and asked passengers for permission to search their lug-
gage-was not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.97 Instead, he joined Justice Marshall's dissenting opin-
ion, which criticized this "latest tactic in the drug war"98 as "'inconve-
nient, intrusive, and intimidating"' and prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.99
The one majority opinion the Justice wrote in a Terry case steered
a middle course. The issue in that case-Michigan v. Chesternutl -
was whether a suspect who fled at the sight of a police car, which then
accelerated and drove alongside him for a brief period, had been
stopped within the meaning of the Terry line of cases.10 1 The Justice
not used any physical force on the suspect and the suspect had not submitted to the of-
ficer's assertion of authority); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,330 (1990) (upholding Terry
stop based on anonymous tip, and noting that the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop a
suspect can be established with evidence that is not only lesser in quantity, but also less
reliable, than that needed to satisfy the probable cause standard); United States v. Soko-
low, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (upholding stop of suspect who matched the drug-courier profile);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 688 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joining ma-
jority opinion upholding 20-minute detention as permissible Terry stop, and also noting
that he would have dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits because the defend-
ants had become fugitives); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (extending
Terry to permit stops of those suspected of committing prior felonies); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1054 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (joining portion of majority opinion that extended Terry frisk to a search of a car,
but disagreeing with the Court's creation of a presumption that state court rulings are not
based on independent and adequate state grounds); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147
(1972) (permitting Terry stop based on tip provided by known informant).
93. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
94. See id. at 502.
95. Id. at 519 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
97. See id at 439-40.
98. Id. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Chandler, 744 F.
Supp. 333, 335 (D.D.C. 1990)).
100. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
101. See id at 572.
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rejected both the state's contention that "the Fourth Amendment is
never implicated until an individual stops in response to the police's
show of authority" and the defendant's position that "any and all po-
lice 'chases' are Fourth Amendment seizures," noting that the parties'
attempts to "fashion a bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory
pursuits" contravened the Court's "traditional contextual approach"
of taking into account ""'all of the circumstances surrounding the in-
cident"'" in each individual case."° Noting that there was no indica-
tion that the police had used their sirens, flashers, or weapons or had
tried to block the suspect's path, the Justice concluded that the suspect
had not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:
"the police conduct involved here would not have communicated to
the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude
upon respondent's freedom of movement," he wrote. °3
The Justice's record in the area of administrative searches is also
difficult to categorize. In Wyman v. James,"° the Justice's first major-
ity opinion as a member of the Court, he concluded that a
caseworker's home visit to a welfare recipient's home did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. 105 The Justice's opinion questioned whether
the home visit even qualified as a "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes, noting that the plaintiff was not "forced or compelled" to
consent to the caseworker's visit (although denial of permission would
have led to termination of her welfare benefits). 06 Even if the visit
constituted a search, the Justice continued, it was a valid administra-
tive search. 07 Describing the caseworker as "not a sleuth but
rather ... a friend to one in need" whose "primary objective is, or
should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient,"'
08
the Justice thought that the state had a legitimate interest "in seeing
and assuring that the intended and proper objects of... tax-produced
assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses."'1 9
Some of the same themes can be found in the Justice's majority
opinion sixteen years later in New York v. Burger,"0 which upheld a
New York statute that authorized warrantless inspections of automo-
102. Id. at 572 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1084) (quoting United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion))).
103. Id. at 575.
104. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
105. See id. at 318.
106. Id. at 317-18.
107. See &L at 326.
108. Id. at 322-23.
109. Id. at 319.
110. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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bile junkyards."' Noting that junkyards were closely regulated busi-
nesses in New York, thus diminishing the owner's expectation of
privacy, the Justice concluded that the state had a substantial interest
in regulating that industry because "automobile theft has become a
significant social problem." '112 He explained that frequent, surprise in-
spections were necessary because "stolen cars and parts often pass
quickly through an automobile junkyard," so that "a warrant require-
ment would interfere with the statute's purpose of deterring automo-
bile theft.""' 3 Moreover, he refused to attach "any constitutional
significance" to the fact that police officers conducted the inspections,
reasoning that "[a]s a practical matter, many States do not have the
resources to assign the enforcement of a particular administrative
scheme to a specialized agency. "114
111. See id. at 712.
112. Id. at 708.
113. Id. at 710.
114. Id at 717. For other cases where the Justice approved of administrative searches,
see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (joining
majority opinion allowing warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service em-
ployees seeking a transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (joining majority opinion upholding warrant-
less, suspicionless drug testing of federal railroad employees who had been involved in
certain accidents or had violated certain safety rules); United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (joining majority opinion permitting customs officials to
detain traveler based on reasonable suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimen-
tary canal); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (joining majority opinion uphold-
ing federal mine safety statute's authorization of warrantless inspections of mines for
health and safety violations); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (joining majority opinion striking down random suspicionless stops of vehicles
to check license and registration with the understanding that the Court was not invalidat-
ing "other... purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point)"); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (joining majority opinion allowing
Border Patrol to briefly question occupants of vehicles passing through permanent fixed
checkpoints away from the border, and to refer some of them, without reasonable suspi-
cion, to a secondary inspection area for further limited inquiries); United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (joining opinion concur-
ring only in the result in case requiring that Border Patrol have probable cause before
conducting warrantless searches of cars at fixed highway checkpoints; objecting that the
Court had "dismantled major parts of the apparatus by which the Nation has attempted to
intercept millions of aliens who enter and remain illegally in this country"); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 285 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (refusing to join
majority opinion holding that roving Border Patrol agents could conduct warrantless
search of a car 25 miles from the border only if they had probable cause); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result) (concurring in the
result where majority upheld federal statute authorizing warrantless inspections of business
premises of firearms dealers, and noting that he would have dissented in prior case, Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970), which invalidated warrantless
forcible inspection of licensed liquor dealer).
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But the Justice was not always so accepting of administrative
searches. When the Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O.11 that school
officials could make a warrantless inspection of a high school student's
purse based only on reasonable suspicion that she had violated school
rules by smoking, 116 the Justice concurred in the result. Although he
agreed with much of the Court's opinion, he wrote separately because
he thought the majority had missed "a crucial step" by failing to ac-
knowledge that it was appropriate to use a balancing test to determine
the constitutionality of a search, rather than "strictly applying the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable Cause Clause, only when
we [are] confronted with 'a special law enforcement need for greater
flexibility.""' 7 The Justice ultimately found such a need in that case,
concluding that "[t]he special need for an immediate response to be-
havior that threatens either the safety of school children and teachers
or the educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school
searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement.""-8
In Griffin v. Wisconsin," 9 by contrast, the Justice could not dis-
cern any special need that would support the warrantless administra-
tive search of a probationer's home. Although he acknowledged that
"a probation agent must have latitude in observing a probationer if
the agent is to carry out his supervisory responsibilities effectively,"' 20
and therefore would have permitted a search based only on reason-
able suspicion, he did not find any "special law enforcement needs
justify[ing] a modification of the protection afforded a probationer's
privacy by the warrant requirement."'' Likewise, he dissented in
O'Connor v. Ortega,22 finding no "'special need' . .. to justify dis-
pensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements" because
the hospital officials who searched the desk and fie cabinets of a doc-
tor under investigation for various improprieties could have sought a
search warrant "[w]ithout sacrificing their ultimate goal of maintain-
ing an effective institution devoted to training and healing.5'1 2
In many areas, then, the Justice's Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence cannot be easily characterized as either liberal or conservative.
115. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
116. See id. at 340-42.
117. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
118. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
119. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
120. Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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When it came to car searches, however, the Justice was willing to give
the police a good deal of leeway. In his first full Term on the Court,
he joined the dissenters in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,24 disagreeing
with the majority's holding that the police violated the Fourth
Amendment when they seized the defendant's automobile from the
driveway of his home, towed it to the police station, and searched it
two days later without ever obtaining a search warrant. 1' Three years
later, he wrote the plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis, 2 6 upholding
the warrantless seizure of a car from a public parking lot and the sub-
sequent warrantless search of its exterior.127 "'The search of an auto-
mobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building,"' the
Justice wrote in Cardwell."2 Thus, it was no surprise when he agreed
with the majority's decision a decade later in California v. Carney,29
which approved the warrantless search of a motor home parked in a
public parking lot.130
Justice Blackmun likewise sided with the government in a series
of cases in which the Court vacillated concerning the constitutionality
of warrantless searches of the containers found during automobile
searches. He dissented from the Court's holding in United States v.
Chadwick'3' that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when
they searched a locked footlocker that had been seized from the open
trunk of a car parked outside a train terminal. 32 Two years later, he
dissented again in Arkansas v. Sanders 33 when the Court invalidated
the search of an unlocked suitcase found in the trunk of a taxicab. 34
His dissenting opinion in Sanders took the position that "a warrant
should not be required to seize and search any personal property
found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched with-
out a warrant" under the car search exception.
35
124. 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joining Black, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 472-73 (majority opinion).
126. 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
127. See id. at 585.
128. Id. at 590 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
129. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
130. See id at 392-95; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (joining major-
ity opinion allowing search incident to arrest of the occupant of a vehicle to extend to the
entire passenger compartment of the car).
131. 433 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 11-13 (majority opinion).
133. 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 766 (majority opinion).
135. Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun steadfastly adhered to that position during the
following twelve years, as the Court struggled with the issue. 136 He
ultimately convinced the rest of the Court and wrote the majority
opinion in California v. Acevedo, 37 putting the rulings in Chadwick
and Sanders to rest. Noting that "[u]ntil today, this Court has drawn a
curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally
turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally
turns up in an automobile,' 38 Justice Blackmun's opinion in Acevedo
opted for "one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches": 39 that
"[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it
where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained."' 40 Interestingly, the Justice's opinion held out some hope
for criminal defendants when it noted that a search of Acevedo's en-
tire vehicle would have been impermissible on the facts there-where
the police watched Acevedo leave the home of a suspected drug
dealer carrying a paper bag the approximate size of packages they
knew contained marijuana, place the bag in the trunk of his car, and
drive away.'4 1 Although the police had probable cause to believe the
paper bag contained marijuana, the Justice wrote, they "did not have
probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other
part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have
been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."' 42
Even here, however, there was one type of warrantless car
search-the inventory search of an impounded vehicle-that the Jus-
tice was less willing to accept than some of his colleagues. He did join
the Court's opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman,43 which initially
approved of warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles, so
136. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with judgment that police violated the Fourth Amendment by opening two
packages wrapped in green opaque plastic that were found in the luggage compartment of
a station wagon); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (indicating adherence to his previous dissents, but joining majority opinion overruling
Robbins and upholding search of paper bag and leather pouch found in trunk of defend-
ant's car in the interest of obtaining an "authoritative ruling" that would end "the Court's
vacillation in ... 'this troubled area"').
137. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
138. Id. at 580.
139. Id. at 579.
140. Id. at 580.
141. See id.
142. IM.
143. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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long as they were conducted pursuant to standard police practices.'"
When the Court approved of the warrantless inspection of a backpack
found during an inventory search in Colorado v. Bertine'45 however,
the Justice wrote separately in order to "underscore the importance of
having such inventories conducted only pursuant to standardized po-
lice procedures," so as to ensure "that inventory searches will not be
used as a purposeful and general .means of discovering evidence of a
crime.' 46 Moreover, three years later, he concurred only in the judg-
ment in Florida v. Wells;'47 he thought the majority's suggestion that a
police officer "may be afforded discretion in conducting an inventory
search... creates the potential for abuse of Fourth Amendment rights
our earlier inventory-search cases were designed to guard against.'
' 48
Though he was relatively accepting of warrantless car searches in
most contexts, the Justice was more suspicious of warrantless entries
into the home. When the Court held in Payton v. New York 49 that
the police may not arrest a suspect at home without a warrant (absent
consent or exigent circumstances),15 0 the Justice wrote a concurring
opinion, emphasizing "[t]he suspect's interest in the sanctity of his
home."15' He dissented from the Court's holding in Maryland v. Gar-
rison'5 2 that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when
they mistakenly searched an apartment based on a warrant authoriz-
ing the search of another apartment located on the same floor.1
5 3
Noting that "[t]he home always has received special protection in
analysis under the Fourth Amendment," the Justice's dissent con-
cluded that the warrant authorized the search of only one apartment
and that it was unreasonable for the officers-who should have real-
ized that there were seven units in the three-story building-not to
have suspected that the third floor might contain more than one
apartment. 54
144. See id. at 375-76.
145. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
146. Id. at 376 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147. 495 U.S. 1, 10 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. Id. at 11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
150. See id. at 576.
151. id at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
152. 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
153. See id at 88-89.
154. Id at 90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,
817 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining dissenting opinion concluding that police of-
ficers' 19-hour stay in defendants' apartment while awaiting issuance of a search warrant
was an unconstitutional search and seizure of the apartment that could not be justified by
exigent circumstances); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755-56 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
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Thus, Justice Blackmun's philosophy in search and seizure cases
does not easily fit into conservative/liberal labels. In certain cases, he
was reluctant to give the Fourth Amendment a broad reading. He
was, for example, unwilling to interpret the Amendment to require an
exclusionary remedy, and he gave the police relatively free rein in
conducting automobile searches. But in other areas, he strayed from
the "law and order" platform on which he was nominated,155 resisting,
for example, the Court's tendency to ignore the warrant and probable
cause requirements and instead resolve all Fourth Amendment cases
by applying a balancing test.
B. The Confession Cases
Justice Blackmun was not yet a member of the Court in the mid-
1960s when it held in Massiah v. United States' 56 that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits the police from interrogating a suspect outside
the presence of counsel after the suspect has already been indicted, 157
or when it interpreted the Fifth Amendment to require the police to
give the now famous Miranda warnings before interrogating a suspect
in police custody.' 58 But he did serve on the Court during the follow-
ing two decades, as the Burger and Rehnquist Courts narrowed these
Warren Court precedents. In analyzing Justice Blackmun's role in the
Court's retreat in this area, I first consider the Court's Miranda cases
and then its Sixth Amendment and due process cases.
1. The Miranda Cases
Justice Blackmun joined willingly in the Court's deconstitutional-
ization of Miranda. He signed on to Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Michigan v. Tucker,159 which referred to the Miranda rights
as "prophylactic standards" 6 0 -"procedural safeguards [that] were
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimina-
concurring) (joining majority opinion finding that exigent circumstances did not justify
warrantless entry into suspect's home to arrest him for driving while intoxicated, though
noting his amazement that the State treated the crime as only a civil, nonjailable traffic
offense); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981) (joining majority opinion re-
quiring search warrant to enter a third party's home in order to arrest a suspect).
155. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
156. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
157. See icL at 205-06.
158. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-81 (1966).
159. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
160. Id at 446.
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tion was protected. '161 When the Court picked up on Tucker's char-
acterization of Miranda a decade later-both in creating an exception
to Miranda for questions "reasonably prompted by a concern for the
public safety" in New York v. Quarles,162 and then again in Oregon v.
Elstad,63 when it refused to apply the fruits of the poisonous tree doc-
trine to exclude a second confession that followed an earlier confes-
sion given without the benefit of Miranda warnings'64 -the Justice
agreed with the majority on both occasions.
Likewise, the Justice joined a group of opinions that refused to
impose strict limitations on police officers seeking waivers of Miranda
rights. 65 He wrote in only one of them-North Carolina v. Butler-to
make clear his assumption that the standard applied in determining
the validity of a waiver of "'fundamental constitutional rights"' had
no relevance in assessing the validity of a waiver "under Miranda's
prophylactic rule."'' 66 He also joined the majority in a series of cases
narrowly interpreting Miranda's requirement that a suspect be in cus-
tody in order to trigger the right to warnings. 67
161. Id. at 444.
162. 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984); see also id. at 654 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
163. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
164. See id. at 306-07 (citing Tucker and referring to Miranda as "sweep[ing] more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself").
165. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (upholding validity of Miranda
waiver despite the fact that suspect was not aware of all the crimes about which he was
going to be questioned); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30 (1987) (upholding a
qualified waiver of Miranda, where suspect indicated a willingness to speak to police but
said he would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present); Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) (holding that the validity of defendant's waiver of Mi-
randa was not affected by the failure of the police to inform him that an attorney had been
trying to call him because "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and
entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right"); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-
74 (1979) (refusing to require explicit waivers of Miranda and allowing for the possibility of
implied waivers).
166. Butler, 441 U.S. at 377 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
167. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,439-40 (1984) (ruling that suspect was not
in custody during traffic stop); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-34 (1984) (holding
that defendant was not in custody when he made incriminating statement in his probation
officer's office during meeting he was required to attend under the terms of his probation);
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (finding that defendant was
not in custody during interview at police station because he came to the station voluntarily
and was allowed to leave at the end of the meeting); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
495 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that conversation at police station was not custodial be-
cause the defendant came voluntarily, was told he was not under arrest, and left the station
at the end of the interview); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding
that defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings during interview by IRS agents in a
private home, even though he was the focus of their investigation of criminal tax fraud).
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Although it took the Court fourteen years after Miranda to ad-
dress the second prerequisite for the right to warnings-that the sus-
pect be undergoing interrogation-once it did define "interrogation"
in Rhode Island v. Innis,'68 the definition itself proved fairly noncon-
troversial. 69 More controversial was the majority's holding that the
police did not interrogate Innis by mentioning that a school for dis-
abled children was located in the vicinity and then remarking, "'God
forbid one of them might find [the murder weapon] and they might
hurt themselves.'" 70 There was no evidence that the police "should
have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response" from Innis, the majority concluded. 7'
Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority in Innis, he
joined Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion seven years later in Arizona
v. Mauro,72 disagreeing with the Court's ruling that a suspect who
told the police that he did not want to make any further statements
without an attorney was not subject to interrogation when the police
allowed his wife to meet with him in the presence of a police officer
and a tape recorder. 73 The majority noted that "[o]fficers do not in-
terrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself"
and concluded that the police actions in Mauro were "far less ques-
tionable than the 'subtle compulsion' that we held not to be interroga-
tion in Innis."'74  In contrast, the dissenters, including Justice
Blackmun, would have found that the "powerful psychological ploy"
engaged in by the police-" [taking] advantage of Mrs. Mauro's re-
quest to visit her husband [and] setting up a confrontation between
them at a time when he manifestly desired to remain silent"-consti-
tuted an interrogation violative of Miranda.75
But three years later, the Justice was once again a member of the
majority when the Court held in Illinois v. Perkins17 6 that a prisoner
was not entitled to Miranda warnings when he was questioned by an
168. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
169. The Court defined "interrogation" for Miranda purposes as either "express ques-
tioning or its functional equivalent"-i.e., "any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 300-01.
Only Justice Stevens disagreed with this definition. See id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 294-95 (majority opinion).
171. Id. at 302.
172. 481 U.S. 520, 530 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 527-29 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 529 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980)).
175. Id. at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
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undercover police officer posing as another inmate. 177 "Conversa-
tions between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the
concerns underlying Miranda," the Court concluded, because "[tihe
essential ingredients of a 'police-dominated atmosphere' and compul-
sion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to
someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate."'178
The precision of the language the police must use in giving a sus-
pect Miranda warnings is another issue on which the Justice's position
seemingly changed during his years on the Court. He joined the
Court's per curiam opinion in California v. Prysock,179 which held that
a suspect was adequately informed of his Miranda right to counsel
when the police told him that he had the right to have an attorney
present during interrogation, and then "after a brief interlude,"'8 ° ad-
ded that he had "'the right to have a lawyer appointed to represent
you at no cost to yourself."" 8 Although the three dissenters-Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens-argued that the suspect was
"'not given the crucial information that the services of the free attor-
ney were available prior to the impending questioning,'"18 2 the major-
ity held that "no talismanic incantation" is required to satisfy
Miranda"3 and concluded that the police had "fully conveyed" to the
suspect his right to appointed counsel. 84
A similar issue arose eight years later in Duckworth v. Eagan,18 5
where the police informed a suspect that he had the right to have an
attorney present during interrogation "'even if you cannot afford to
hire one,"' and then said, "'We have no way of giving you a lawyer,
but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to
court."" 86  Once again, the majority found that the police had
"touched all of the bases required by Miranda," dismissing the "if and
when you go to court" qualification as "accurately describ[ing] the
procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana."' 87 This time,
Justice Blackmun joined the three Prysock dissenters, who chided the
majority for making "a mockery" of Miranda by allowing the police to
177. See id. at 294.
178. Id. at 296.
179. 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 357 (per curiam) (quoting tape of interrogation session).
182. Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting state appellate court's opinion).
183. Id. at 359 (per curiam).
184. Id. at 361.
185. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
186. Id. at 198 (quoting waiver form read to suspect).
187. Id. at 203-04.
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create the misimpression that "only 'those accused who can afford an
attorney have the right to have one present before answering any
questions; those who are not so fortunate must wait."1 8
Turning to the Supreme Court decisions involving suspects who
were given Miranda warnings and attempted to invoke their rights,
one of the two majority opinions Justice Blackmun wrote in the con-
fessions area was such a case.'8 9 In Fare v. Michael C.,90 the Court
held that a juvenile had not invoked his Miranda rights by requesting
to speak to his probation officer.' 91 Noting "the unique role the law-
yer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this country,"'192
the Justice's majority opinion distinguished requests for an attorney
from requests for "a probation officer, a clergyman, or a close
friend."' 93 Although the Justice went on to observe that a request to
speak to a probation officer may indicate that a juvenile did not know-
ingly and voluntarily waive Miranda rights under the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach used to determine the validity of such waiv-
ers, he declined to "impos[e] rigid restraints on police and courts" in
cases where a suspect does not ask for an attorney 94
The Justice's reference in Fare to the "pivotal role of legal coun-
sel"' 95 proved to be prophetic: one group of cases in which he showed
almost unwavering support for the defendant were those applying the
per se rule that attaches when a suspect invokes the right to counsel.
The Justice joined the majority's ruling in Edwards v. Arizona196 that
the police must immediately cease interrogation in such cases.' 97 He
also supported the Court's extension of Edwards to prohibit the police
from interrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel
about an unrelated offense' 98 and from reinitiating interrogation even
188. Id. at 215-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court of Appeals' opinion,
Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)).
189. For a description of the other case-Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)-see
infra text accompanying notes 200-04.
190. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
191. See id. at 724.
192. Id. at 719.
193. Id. at 722.
194. Id. at 725.
195. Id at 722.
196. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
197. See id. at 487.
198. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988). In so holding, the Court distin-
guished its prior ruling in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (an opinion which
the Justice also joined), in which it had held that the police may question a suspect who
invoked the right to remain silent about an unrelated crime so long as they "scrupulously
honored" the suspect's right to silence.
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after the suspect has consulted with an attorney, unless the attorney is
present.199
The Justice did write the majority opinion in Oregon v. Hass,2°°
which held that statements taken in violation of Edwards may be in-
troduced for impeachment purposes." 1 Analogizing Hass to prior
Supreme Court cases that had allowed the impeachment use of evi-
dence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment2° and statements
given without the benefit of Miranda warnings whatsoever, 0 3 the Jus-
tice reasoned that excluding the defendant's statements from the pros-
ecution's case in chief provided sufficient deterrence for Edwards
violations and that "the shield provided by Miranda is not to be per-
verted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. '20 4
Nevertheless, the Justice joined with the dissenters on each of the two
occasions when the Court attempted to limit the otherwise strict Ed-
wards prohibition. He disagreed with the plurality opinion in Oregon
v. Bradshaw,"5 which concluded that a defendant who asked, "Well,
what is going to happen to me now?" had initiated further communi-
cation with the police, indicating "a willingness and a desire for a gen-
eralized discussion about the investigation," and thus had taken
himself out of the Edwards protection.20 6 He also refused to join the
majority opinion in Davis v. United States,20 7 which held that a suspect
who said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer, ' 20 had not invoked his
right to counsel because the Edwards rule is triggered only if a suspect
"unambiguously request[s] counsel ... sufficiently clearly that a rea-
sonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney."2 9
199. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1990).
200. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
201. See id. at 723-24.
202. See id. at 721 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
203. See id. at 720-23 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
204. Id. at 722.
205. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (plurality opinion).
206. Id. at 1045-46; see id. at 1051 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
208. Id. at 455.
209. Id. at 459; see id. at 446 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). The Justice like-
wise voted in favor of the defendant in both cases that arose during his tenure on the Court
concerning the applicability of the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment. In Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986), he joined the majority in applying Edwards to bar police
from interrogating defendants who had invoked their Sixth Amendment rights by request-
ing the appointment of counsel at arraignment. And then, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S.
171, 175-76 (1991), he joined the dissenters when the Court distinguished Jackson and held
that a defendant's invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a bail hearing did
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2. The Sixth Amendment Cases
Although the Supreme Court's recent confession cases involve
Miranda claims more often than Sixth Amendment claims, the major-
ity of Justice Blackmun's opinions are in the Sixth Amendment area.
In his early years on the Court, he tended to vote in favor of the pros-
ecution in such cases. He wrote a dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Wil-
liams,210 disagreeing with the majority's ruling that Detective
Leaming's "Christian burial speech" '' had violated Williams' Sixth
Amendment rights under Massiah1 2 by "deliberately and designedly
set[ting] out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as-and
perhaps more effectively than-if he had formally interrogated
him. '21 3 In dissent, Justice Blackmun disputed the majority's charac-
terization of Detective Leaming's intent, noting that the victim had
been missing for only a few days and might still be alive and conclud-
ing that "Leaming's purpose was not solely to obtain incriminating
information."2 4 More generally, the Justice argued that "not every
attempt to elicit information should be regarded as 'tantamount to
interrogation,"' and he criticized as "far too broad" the majority's
holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated "whenever police en-
gage in any conduct, in the absence of counsel, with the subjective
desire to obtain information from a suspect after arraignment. '215
Eight years later, however, Justice Blackmun provided the crucial
fifth vote in Maine v. Moulton,216 which held that the police had vio-
lated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by arranging to have
his codefendant record a meeting the defendant had set up to discuss
strategy for their upcoming trial.21 7 The majority concluded that the
police had "knowingly circumvent[ed] the accused's right to have
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state
not bar the police from interrogating him about other unrelated crimes. See id. at 185-86
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
211. The speech was so labeled because of Leaming's request that Williams think about
helping the police locate the body of the girl he had killed because "the parents of [the]
little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away
from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered." Id. at 393.
212. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes
156-57.
213. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399.
214. Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). Justice Black-
mun also joined a dissent written by Justice White, which argued that Williams had waived
his Sixth Amendment rights. See id. at 429 (White, J., dissenting).
216. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
217. See i at 180.
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agent," '218 rejecting the state's argument (reminiscent of the Justice's
dissent in Brewer v. Williams219 ) that the defendant's statements
should not be suppressed because the police had "other, legitimate
reasons" for listening to his conversation-to investigate his plans to
kill a prosecution witness and to protect the codefendant's safety.220
Likewise, the Justice wrote a dissenting opinion in Patterson v.
Illinois,221 disagreeing with the majority's ruling that a suspect who
had been indicted on murder charges had waived his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel by waiving his Miranda right to counsel.222 Ar-
guing that the Sixth Amendment-unlike Miranda-requires that
defendants be provided with counsel even if they do not specifically
make such a request, the Justice's dissent maintained that "after for-
mal adversary proceedings against a defendant have been com-
menced, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the defendant not be
'"subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him."' "223
One area, however, where the Justice was steadfastly unsympa-
thetic to defendants' Sixth Amendment claims was in the so-called
"listening post" cases-where a police informant merely listened to
the defendant's incriminating statements and reported them to the au-
thorities. He dissented from the Court's conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment was violated in United States v. Henry,224 noting that the
informant there had been instructed not to ask Henry any questions
or initiate any conversations about the charges pending against him.22
And six years later, he joined the majority opinion in Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,226 which ultimately upheld the constitutionality of using an in-
formant who acts as a "listening post. '227 The police violate the Sixth
Amendment only if they take "some action, beyond merely listening,
that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks," the
Court held in Kuhlmann.2'
218. Id. at 176.
219. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
220. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 178.
221. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
222. See i. at 300 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. Id (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986) (quoting Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981))).
224. 447 U.S. 264, 277 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 278, 287-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
227. See id. at 459.
228. Id.
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3. The Due Process Cases
The Justice's voting record in the few cases that arose during his
tenure on the Court involving the third constitutional vehicle for at-
tacking the admissibility of one's confession-the due process volun-
tariness test-is likewise difficult to characterize. In Colorado v.
Connelly," 9 he joined the majority's holding that a confession cannot
be deemed involuntary in a constitutional sense absent proof of coer-
cive police conduct, thereby rejecting the claim that the defendant's
mental illness interfered with his free will and rendered his confession
involuntary. 3 Yet he voted against the government on both issues
before the Court in Arizona v. Fulminante:31 he agreed with the ma-
jority that an undercover informant's offer to protect Fulminante from
"tough treatment" he was getting from other inmates so long as
Fulminante would "tell [him] about it" rendered the resulting confes-
sion involuntary,3 2 and he sided with the dissenters' view that coerced
confession claims should not be subject to a harmless error analysis.
Thus, as in the Fourth Amendment arena, the Justice's voting rec-
ord in the confession cases is not easily categorized. Although he did
not believe that the Miranda warnings are constitutionally required,
he was sympathetic to suspects who had attempted to invoke their
Miranda right to counsel. Perhaps linked to this tendency to support
those seeking the advice of counsel, the Justice seemed more inclined
to side with defendants who challenged confessions on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds, especially in his later years on the Court (with the nota-
ble exception of the listening post cases). His votes in other
confession cases were similarly split between the defense and the
prosecution.
C. The Right to Counsel Cases
Although some of the confession cases discussed in the prior sec-
tion implicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Justice Black-
mun wrote more frequently in the more traditional right to counsel
cases. In analyzing his views in this area, I consider in turn the
229. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
230. See id. at 170. The Justice did, however, decline to join the portion of the Court's
opinion discussing the standard of proof the prosecution must satisfy in order to prove a
valid waiver of Miranda rights because that issue had not been raised or briefed by the
parties and was not necessary to the Court's decision. See id. at 171 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
231. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
232. Ia- at 283, 287-88.
233. See id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
246 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:219
Supreme Court opinions analyzing the right to appointed counsel, the
validity of waivers of counsel, claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel on appeal.
1. The Right to Appointed Counsel
The Justice was not yet a member of the Court when Gideon v.
WainwrighP2 4 interpreted the Sixth Amendment to obligate the states
to provide indigent defendants with appointed counsel, 5 but three
cases were decided during his second full Term on the Court regarding
the reach of Gideon. In one of these cases, Adams v. Illinois, 6 the
Justice wrote an opinion concurring in the result, indicating that he
thought the Court had been wrong in Coleman v. Alabama2 7 to ex-
tend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the preliminary-hearing
stage.238 In the second, Kirby v. Illinois,"9 he joined the plurality in
refusing to require the appointment of counsel at a pre-indictment
identification procedure on the grounds that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not triggered until "the initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings.""24
On the other hand, in the third case, Argersinger v. Hamlin,24 the
Justice supported the Court's extension of Gideon to require the
states to appoint counsel for any indigent defendant who was impris-
oned for any offense-whether a felony, misdemeanor, or petty of-
fense.242 Seven years later, he dissented in Scott v. Illinois,24 3 when
the Court refused to apply Argersinger to indigent defendants charged
234. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
235. See id. at 344-45.
236. 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
237. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
238. See Adams, 405 U.S. at 286 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result). The Court
held in Adams that Coleman should not be applied retroactively to preliminary hearings
conducted before the date Coleman was decided. See id. at 283-85 (majority opinion).
239. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion).
240. Id. at 689 (defining "adversary judicial proceedings" to mean indictment, informa-
tion, arraignment, preliminary hearing, or formal charge). The Justice himself wrote the
majority opinion in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), another case involving the
right to counsel at a pretrial identification proceeding. In holding that the right to counsel
does not extend to a post-indictment photo display conducted by the government, the Jus-
tice's opinion distinguished the Warren Court's holding in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 226-27 (1967) (guaranteeing defendants a right to counsel at post-indictment lineups)
on the grounds that a photo display is not a "trial-like adversary confrontation" where a
defendant might be "misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his
professional adversary." Ash, 413 U.S. at 317.
241. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
242. See id. at 37.
243. 440 U.S. 367, 389 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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with misdemeanors or petty offenses unless they actually received a
prison sentence.2 " Rather, the Justice's dissenting opinion in Scott
argued for a "bright line" rule that would also require the state to
appoint counsel for any indigent defendant charged with a nonpetty
offense (i.e., a crime punishable by more than six months in prison).2 4 5
The Justice's position on a related issue-the permissible uses of
prior uncounseled convictions-evolved somewhat during his time on
the Court. In his early years on the Court, the Justice dissented from
the majority's holding in United States v. Tucker 46 that a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial judge consid-
ered two prior convictions violative of Gideon in imposing sen-
tence.2 47 He likewise dissented in Loper v. Beto, 48 where the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant whose prior uncounseled con-
victions were introduced in order to impeach his testimony.249 His
dissent in each case was tied to the particular facts and his belief that
the use of the uncounseled convictions did not affect the outcome of
the case. 0
By 1980, however, the Justice's position on this issue had shifted
in favor of criminal defendants. He wrote a concurring opinion in
Baldasar v. Illinois,1 1 adhering to the "bright line" position he had
taken in his Scott dissent, and concluding that the defendant should
therefore have received appointed counsel at his prior trial on misde-
meanor theft charges." 2 Because that prior conviction was thus "in-
valid" in the Justice's view, he argued that it could not be used to
convert a subsequent misdemeanor theft charge into a felony under
the state's statutory enhancement provision. 3 When the Court ulti-
mately overruled Baldasar in Nichols v. United States,"4 the Justice
244. See id. at 369 (majority opinion).
245. Id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
247. See id. at 44849.
248. 405 U.S. 473, 494 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
249. See id at 483 (plurality opinion).
250. See idt at 495-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the difficulty of retrying the
defendant 25 years after the crime, his subsequent criminal record, and the fact that he was
already out on parole); Tucker, 404 U.S. at 450-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing
that the defendant admitted his prior criminal conduct at trial and that the same judge who
sentenced him had denied his habeas petition on the ground that any error was harmless).
251. 446 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
252. See id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
254. 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994) (allowing the use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction for which no prison term had been imposed to increase defendant's sentence
under the federal sentencing guidelines).
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wrote the primary dissenting opinion, arguing that "uncounseled mis-
demeanor convictions lack the reliability this Court has always consid-
ered a prerequisite for the imposition of any term of incarceration.""
2. Waivers of the Right to Counsel
This belief in the importance of counsel led the Justice to solici-
tously protect defendants from unknowingly waiving or forfeiting
their right to counsel. In fact, the first time he cast the deciding vote
in favor of a criminal defendant came in one such case, Boyd v. Dut-
ton,2 6 where the majority reversed the lower courts' denial of habeas
relief and held that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine
whether the prisoner had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to counsel prior to entering a guilty plea. 5 7 Writing a separate con-
curring opinion, the Justice acknowledged some "initial hesitation" in
voting to overturn "the unanimous judgment of four courts," but ulti-
mately voted in the defendant's favor given the facts of the particular
case:
[A] 20-year-old who claims he could not read or write (although
he apparently was able to sign his name to the petition in the
present proceeding) receive[d] four consecutive seven-year
sentences, totaling 28 years, for forging three checks within a
fortnight in the respective amounts of $45, $45, and $40, and for
possessing a forged check in the amount of $10.58
Seventeen years later, the Justice showed no such hesitation in
dissenting when the Court refused in Caplin & Drysdale v. United
States259 to find that the federal statute requiring forfeiture of drug
proceeds created an exemption for funds used to pay defense coun-
sel.26° Emphasizing "the distinct role of the right to counsel of choice
in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, ''2 61 Justice Black-
mun's dissenting opinion concluded that it was "unseemly and unjust
for the Government to beggar those it prosecutes in order to disable
their defense at trial. '
262
255. Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the Justice's dissent relied on
the Tucker decision, with which he had disagreed. See id. at 762.
256. 405 U.S. 1 (1972) (per curiam).
257. See id. at 3.
258. Id. at 3-4 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
259. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
260. See id. at 619.
261. Id. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 172-73 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining dissenting opinion, which argued that
the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to allow the defendant to waive his
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The Justice was so reluctant to see a defendant waive the right to
counsel that he dissented in Faretta v. California,263 declining to read a
right to represent oneself into the Sixth Amendment.2' Quoting the
well-known proverb "[o]ne who is his own lawyer has a fool for a
client, 265 the Justice wrote: "I do not believe that any amount of pro
se pleading can cure the injury to society of an unjust result, but I do
believe that a just result should prove to be an effective balm for al-
most any frustrated pro se defendant. 26 6 Then, in one of his last
Terms on the Court, he dissented from the Court's ruling in Godinez
v. Moran,267 which held that the standard for determining a defend-
ant's competency to waive the right to counsel or plead guilty is no
higher than the rational-understanding standard used to determine
competency to stand trial.268 Noting that "[a] person who is 'compe-
tent' to play basketball is not thereby 'competent' to play the violin,"
the Justice criticized the majority's "monolithic approach to compe-
tency" as "true to neither life nor the law"269 and concluded that "a
defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting his own defense can-
not be considered 'competent' to make . . . a decision" to waive
counsel.270
3. The Requirement of Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Justice's voting record in cases raising ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims is more difficult to categorize. He joined the Court's
opinions both in Strickland v. Washington,27 which defined unconsti-
tutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in a "highly deferential"
manner, requiring "a strong presumption" that the attorney's repre-
sentation fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assist-
ance," 272 and in the companion case, United States v. Cronic,2 73 which
right to conflict-free representation and retain the attorney who was representing two of
his codefendants).
263. 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 807 (majority opinion).
265. Id at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266. Id at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267. 509 U.S. 389, 409 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 391 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 416 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
271. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
272. Id. at 689. Specifically, the Court held that a claim of ineffective assistance re-
quires proof that the attorney "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and
also proof of prejudice-that is, "a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Id. at 693-94.
273. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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refused to presume ineffective assistance based on the inexperience of
defense counsel (a young real-estate lawyer who had never conducted
a jury trial) and his lack of time to prepare for trial (twenty-five
days).274 But in subsequent cases requiring the Court to apply the
standard set out in Strickland, the Justice dissented from the major-
ity's findings that the Sixth Amendment had not been violated.2 75
Justice Blackmun's votes in cases raising a related question-
when an attorney's conflict of interest rises to the level of ineffective
assistance-reflect a similar trend. On the one hand, he joined the
majority opinion in Cuyler v. Sullivan,27 6 which held that the Sixth
Amendment is violated in cases where multiple defendants are repre-
sented by one lawyer only if there is proof of "an actual conflict of
interest [that] adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance," and not
by the mere possibility of a conflict of interest.27 7 On the other hand,
he wrote the primary dissenting opinion seven years later in Burger v.
Kemp,27 8 disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that a defendant
who had been represented by a partner of the lawyer who was repre-
senting his confederate in a separate trial had failed to meet the stan-
dard set out in Cuyler.2 79 Noting that the interests of the two
defendants were "diametrically opposed" on the critical issue of their
"comparative culpability" for the crime,2 80 the Justice dismissed the
274. See id. at 662-65.
275. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with the majority's conclusion that defense attorney's failure to object to the pros-
ecution's reliance on a certain aggravating circumstance in a capital case-an objection
that would have been successful at the time of the defendant's sentencing hearing under a
binding appellate court ruling that was later overturned-did not constitute the prejudice
necessary to make out an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Strickland); Burger
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 811-17 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that defense
counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence and to present any evidence at capital
sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance); see also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,
29 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (refusing to join majority opinion,
which held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful lawyer-client rela-
tionship and therefore upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance so that the
public defender who had been representing the defendant could try the case; instead not-
ing that the only issue before the Court was the trial judge's failure to ask how long a
continuance was necessary and therefore declining to join in "rather broad-ranging dicta
about the right to counsel and the concerns of victims (deserving of sympathy as they may
be)").
276. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
277. Id. at 348.
278. 483 U.S. 776, 796 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. See id. at 796 (majority opinion).
280. Id. at 802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority's efforts to explain away the attorney's failure to raise the
defendant's lesser culpability on appeal as "sheer speculation."
2
'
4. The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Counsel on Appeal
Finally, the Justice's position in cases interpreting the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel also seemed to evolve some-
what over the years. He was not sitting on the Court when it decided
in Griffin v. Illinois' that the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses require the states to provide indigent defendants with a trial
transcript in order to appeal their convictions," 3 or when Douglas v.
California 4 extended Griffin to require the appointment of counsel
on appeal. 8 5 But he agreed with the majority in Mayer v. City of
Chicago"6 that Griffin obligates the states to provide a free transcript
even to defendants convicted of minor ordinance violations punish-
able only by fines. 7 Nevertheless, he also joined the majority opin-
ion in Ross v. Moffitt, s which limited the Douglas right to counsel to
the first appeal and therefore denied indigent defendants a right to
appointed counsel in subsequent proceedings before the state
supreme court or the United States Supreme Court.8 9
Two years later, however, the Justice refused to go along when a
plurality of the Court said in United States v. MacCollom29 ° that a fed-
eral prisoner seeking habeas relief was not entitled to a free trial tran-
script, in part because he could have obtained a free transcript on
appeal.291 Having declined to appeal his conviction and therefore
"[h]aving foregone this right," the plurality explained, the prisoner
"may not several years later successfully assert a due process right to
review of his conviction and thereby obtain a free transcript on his
281. Id at 804 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
283. See id. at 19-20.
284. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
285. See iL at 355.
286. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
287. See id. at 193-94. The Justice filed a concurring opinion, suggesting that the state
courts consider on remand whether the defendant was still indigent. See id. at 201 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
288. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
289. See id. at 619. Eight years later, the Justice also agreed with the Court's holding in
Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam), that Ross v. Moffitt fore-
closes defendants from raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to challenge the
quality of representation received from even retained counsel on discretionary appeals to a
state supreme court.
290. 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (plurality opinion).
291. See id. at 324-25.
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own terms as an ancillary constitutional benefit. ' 292 Apparently un-
comfortable with this forfeiture argument, Justice Blackmun con-
curred only in the result. In his view, MacCollom had "a current
opportunity to present his claims fairly" because he could obtain a
transcript so long as his habeas claim was not frivolous and there was
an articulable basis for believing a transcript would be helpful to
him.293 Thus, the Justice found it unnecessary to consider "the consti-
tutional significance of what he might have done at the time a direct
appeal from his conviction could have been taken.
294
Although the Justice sided with both the prosecution and the de-
fense in the right to counsel cases, just as he did in the Fourth Amend-
ment and confession cases, he seemed to vote more consistently in
favor of defendants asserting the right to counsel than in the other two
areas. Even when he joined a majority opinion that articulated a stan-
dard tending to favor the prosecution-for example, the cases setting
out the test to be applied to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and con-
flict-of-interest claims-he was reluctant to give those opinions a
broad reading when asked to apply them to the facts of individual
cases.
D. The Habeas Corpus Cases
Perhaps the area in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
made the greatest inroads in undermining the work of the Warren
Court has been in the law governing habeas petitions.295 While the
Warren Court emphasized the critical role that the writ of habeas
corpus plays in protecting individual rights and correcting constitu-
tional errors, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts-"animated by a deep
conviction that the overriding goal of the criminal justice system is to
punish the guilty and exonerate the innocent"-have focused on the
importance of finality and federalism.
2 96
Early in his tenure on the Court, Justice Blackmun seemed more
sympathetic to the views taken by Chief Justices Burger and Rehn-
quist, expressing misgivings about what he saw as the Court
"wander[ing] a long way down the road in expanding traditional no-
tions of habeas corpus." '2 97 But as the years progressed, he became
292. Id. at 323-24.
293. Id. at 329-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
294. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
295. See Chemerinsky, supra note 38, at 749.
296. Id. at 769.
297. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 353 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the result); see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Black-
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one of the writ's staunchest defenders.2 98 In fact, his final majority
opinion, McFarland v. Scott, 299 observed that "federal habeas corpus
has a particularly important role to play in promoting fundamental
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty. ''3 °° In examining the
Justice's habeas jurisprudence, I consider the position he took in three
areas: the substantive limits on the scope of the writ, the procedural
hurdles erected by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and the degree
to which habeas courts must defer to state court factfinding.
1. Substantive Limits on the Scope of Habeas Relief
In one of its leading habeas decisions, Fay v. Noia,3 10 the Warren
Court held that all constitutional claims are cognizable on habeas." 2
In Stone v. Powell,"3 the Burger Court retreated from that position,
barring prisoners from raising Fourth Amendment claims on habeas
so long as they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims
in state court.3 4 As noted above, Justice Blackmun joined the major-
ity opinion in Stone.305 Thereafter, however, he refused to endorse
any further efforts to limit the type of challenges that may be raised
on habeas.
In fact, three years after Stone, Justice Blackmun wrote the ma-
jority opinion in Rose v. Mitchell,306 refusing to preclude prisoners
from bringing habeas petitions challenging the racial composition of
the grand jury that indicted them.3°7 Observing that a "claim that the
court has discriminated on the basis of race in a given case brings the
integrity of the judicial system into direct question,' 308 the Justice's
opinion concluded that "the strong interest in making available fed-
mun, J., concurring in the result) (noting that "we have come a long way from the tradi-
tional notions of the Great Writ" and that "[the common-law scholars of the past hardly
would recognize what the Court has developed").
298. Cf. Lay, supra note 2, at 14 (observing that even while on the appellate court, the
Justice "generally took a middle of the road stance" in habeas cases and "show[ed] a high
regard for prisoner's rights").
299. 512 U.S. 849 (1994).
300. Id at 859 (holding that a capital defendant need not file a formal habeas petition
in order to invoke the right to counsel under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(q)(4)(B) (1994), and thereby give the federal courts jurisdiction to grant a stay of
execution).
301. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
302. See i&L at 398-99.
303. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
304. See id. at 481-82.
305. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
306. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
307. See id. at 559-64.
308. Id. at 563.
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eral habeas corpus relief outweighs the costs associated with such re-
lief." 09 And in his last Term on the Court, he wrote the dissenting
opinion in Reed v. Farley,310 arguing that a state prisoner should be
permitted to file a habeas petition challenging a violation of the Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers' requirement that he be tried within
120 days, "a violation that Congress found troubling enough to war-
rant the severe remedy of dismissal."'3 1'
Another innovation in habeas jurisprudence on which the Jus-
tice's views evolved over the years concerned the Rehnquist Court's
announcement-in a line of cases beginning with the plurality opinion
in Teague v. Lane3 k2 -that a habeas petition should be evaluated ac-
cording to "the law prevailing at the time the conviction became fi-
nal, ' 3 13 thereby foreclosing a prisoner from taking advantage of "a
new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, '3 14 i.e., any case whose
"result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant's conviction became final." 315 The Justice did not sign on to the
plurality opinion in Teague, but he did join Justice Stevens' opinion, 1 6
which agreed generally with the approach taken by the plurality but
took issue with the narrowness of the exceptions the plurality was will-
ing to endorse.317
Later in the same Term, however, the Justice joined another sepa-
rate opinion written by Justice Stevens, which declined to go along
with the majority's decision to extend Teague to capital cases "without
309. IdL at 564. For further discussion of Rose v. Mitchell, see infra text accompanying
notes 434-36.
310. 512 U.S. 339 (1994).
311. Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,
682 (1993) (joining majority opinion refusing to extend Stone v. Powell to Miranda claims);
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (joining majority opinion refusing to
extend Stone to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
323-24 (1979) (joining majority opinion refusing to extend Stone to insufficiency-of-the-
evidence claims).
312. 489 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
313. Id. at 306.
314. Id. at 299.
315. Id. at 301.
316. See id. at 318 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
317. Justices Blackmun and Stevens agreed with the plurality that a new decision that
made it unconstitutional to punish the defendant's conduct should be applied on habeas,
see id. at 311 (plurality opinion), but they disagreed with the scope of the second exception
the plurality created. While the plurality was willing to recognize an exception for new
rules requiring procedures "central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt," id.
at 313 (plurality opinion), Justices Blackmun and Stevens advocated a broader exception
for new rules that "implicate[ ] concerns of fundamental fairness," even if they do not
undermine the factual accuracy of a conviction. Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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benefit of argument or briefing on the issue." '31 Subsequently, he
completely abandoned ship on the Teague issue. By the following
Term, he was joining Justice Brennan's dissent in Butler v. McKel-
lar,3 19 which condemned Teague for "manifest[ing] growing hostility
toward Congress' decision to authorize federal collateral review of
state criminal convictions, curtailing the writ of habeas corpus by dra-
matically restructuring retroactivity doctrine."32 He continued to
side with the dissenters in subsequent similar cases.32'
Finally, the Justice refused to join the majority's opinion in Brecht
v. Abrahamson,322 which held that a less onerous harmless error stan-
dard applies to "constitutional error[s] of the trial type" on habeas
than on direct appeal.3' Instead of asking whether an error was
"'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"' (the standard applied on di-
rect review under the Court's decision in Chapman v. California),324
the Court in Brecht chose to adopt the harmless error standard it uses
for nonconstitutional errors committed in federal trials, which analyzes
whether the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict.' "3 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
White's dissenting opinion, which described the Chapman standard as
"essential to the safeguard of federal constitutional rights." '326 The
dissenters criticized the "confused patchwork" of the majority's
habeas jurisprudence, "in which the same constitutional right is
318. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 349 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
319. 494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Butler held that
the Court's decision in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), was a "new rule" and
thus could not be raised on habeas because the outcome "was susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds." Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. For a description of Roberson, see supra note
198 and accompanying text.
320. Butler, 494 U.S. at 417 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 259 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing majority's decision to apply Teague as "elevat[ing] its preference for finality in
state proceedings over Congress' commitment 'to provide a federal forum for state prison-
ers"'); Saffle v. Parks, 494.U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority's holding that habeas petitioner was seeking to take advantage of a new rule).
Justice Blackmun also joined the majority in those post-Teague cases that concluded that a
habeas petitioner was not invoking a new rule. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,229-36
(1992); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314-19 (1989).
322. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
323. Id. at 638.
324. Id. at 622 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
325. IL (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
326. Id at 645 (White, J., dissenting).
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treated differently depending on whether its vindication is sought on
direct or collateral review.
327
2. Procedural Hurdles
In addition to cutting back on the substantive scope of habeas
relief, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts also created increasingly rig-
orous procedural hurdles for habeas petitioners. Justice Blackmun
joined the majority's 1976 opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes, 328 which
overturned the Warren Court's ruling in Fay v. Noia329 that state pris-
oners were barred from raising claims on habeas that they had not
brought to the attention of the state courts only if they had "deliber-
ately by-passed" the state courts.330 Relying on the criminal justice
system's interest in finality, the concern that the permissive Fay v.
Noia standard might encourage defense counsel to engage in
"sandbagging," and the belief that "the state trial on the merits
[should be] the 'main event,' ... rather than a 'tryout on the road,'" 331
the Court held in Sykes that a procedural default bars a prisoner from
bringing a claim on habeas unless the prisoner can meet the two-pro-
nged "cause and prejudice" standard,332 which requires a showing of
cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation.333
By the mid-1980s, however, the Justice became less willing to join
the Court in dismissing habeas claims on procedural grounds. Thus,
when the majority in Rose v. Lundy334 held that federal courts are
required to dismiss habeas petitions that contain both claims that have
been exhausted in the state courts as well as unexhausted claims,335
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion suggesting that the federal
courts simply dismiss the unexhausted claims and consider the ex-
hausted claims on the merits.336  Accusing the majority of
327. Id. at 649 (White, J., dissenting).
328. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
329. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
330. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88.
331. Id. at 88-90.
332. The "cause and prejudice" standard had been formulated in Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), and applied to prison-
ers who were collaterally attacking their convictions based on the racial composition of the
grand jury that had indicted them. Justice Blackmun was likewise a member of the major-
ity in both of these cases.
333. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
334. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
335. See id. at 510.
336. See id. at 531-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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"'throw[ing] the baby out with the bath water,' . 337 the Justice thought
that the Court should be less concerned about "deterring the sophisti-
cated habeas petitioner who understands, and wishes to circumvent
the rules of exhaustion" than with protecting "the unwary pro se pris-
oner who is not knowledgeable about the intricacies of the exhaustion
doctrine and whose only aim is to secure a new trial or release from
prison. "338
The Justice likewise refused to completely endorse the Court's
decision in two other cases decided the same Term that elaborated on
the Sykes cause-and-prejudice standard. In the first case, United
States v. Frady,339 the Court held that the federal rule permitting a
criminal conviction to be overturned based on an erroneous jury in-
struction that had not been objected to at trial if the instruction
amounted to "plain error"340 applies only on direct appeal and not on
collateral review.341 Justice Blackmun wrote separately, concurring
only in the judgment. He thought that the plain-error rule had some
applicability on collateral attack, noting that "[w]here a jurisdiction
has established an exception to its contemporaneous-objection re-
quirement and a prisoner's petition for collateral review falls within
that exception, I see no need for the prisoner to prove 'cause' for his
failure to comply with a rule that is inapplicable in his case. '342
In the second case, Engle v. Isaac,143 the Court held that habeas
petitioners could not satisfy the cause requirement by arguing that it
would have been futile to raise an objection to a long-settled state
court practice and also, at least on the facts in that case, could not
demonstrate cause by pointing to the novelty of their constitutional
claims because the claims were "far from unknown at the time of their
trials."'3 " In the course of its opinion, the majority waged a broad
attack on the writ of habeas corpus, noting that it "extends the ordeal
of trial for both society and the accused," "degrades the prominence
of the trial itself," and "frequently cost[s] society the right to punish
admitted offenders. 345 Without comment, Justice Blackmun con-
curred only in the result.3 46
337. Id. at 522 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
338. Id. at 530 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
339. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
340. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
341. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 166.
342. Id. at 177 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
343. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
344. Id. at 130-31.
345. Id. at 127-28.
346. See id. at 135 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Two years later, however, when the Court resolved the issue left
open in Engle and held that the cause requirement is satisfied in cases
where a prisoner failed to raise a claim that was "so novel that its legal
basis [was] not reasonably available to defense counsel,"34 7 the Justice
joined Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. The dissent argued that
the majority's "equating of novelty with cause pushes the Court into a
conundrum," because "[t]he more 'novel' a claimed constitutional
right, the more unlikely a violation of that claimed right undercuts the
fundamental fairness of the trial. 34
8
By the late 1980s, however, the Justice had moved solidly into the
liberal camp on this issue, strenuously resisting the Court's creation of
additional procedural hurdles for habeas petitioners. In Murray v.
Carrier,349 for example, the majority held that the cause-and-prejudice
test is equally applicable to procedural defaults on appeal, and that
the cause requirement is not satisfied by attorney error absent proof
of ineffective assistance of counsel.3  Justice Blackmun joined a sepa-
rate opinion written by Justice Stevens, who argued that less signifi-
cance should be attached to procedural defaults that occur at the
appellate stage.3
Three years later, the Justice wrote the majority opinion in Harris
v. Reed,352 concluding that a procedural default does not bar consider-
ation of a habeas petition unless "the last state court rendering a judg-
ment in the case "'clearly and expressly"' states that its judgment rests
on a state procedural bar. ' 3 3 Although the Justice acknowledged
that "federal habeas review touches upon .. significant state inter-
ests," he rejected the state's argument that applying the "plain state-
ment" rule in this context would unduly burden "the interests of
finality, federalism, and comity. ' 354
During the same Term, the Justice wrote the dissenting opinion in
Dugger v. Adams, 355 accusing the majority of "arbitrarily impos[ing]
procedural obstacles to... send[ ] a man to a presumptively unlawful
execution because he or his lawyers did not raise his objection at what
347. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
348. l at 22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
349. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
350. See id. at 488, 492.
351. See id. at 501, 506-07 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
352. 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
353. Id. at 263 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,327 (1985) (quoting Mich-
igan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983))).
354. Id. at 264.
355. 489 U.S. 401, 412 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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is felt to be the appropriate time for doing so." '356 Specifically, the
Justice argued that habeas relief should not be foreclosed in that case
because the state courts had not consistently applied the procedural
bar rule on which the majority was relying to preclude the petitioner's
habeas claim.3
5 7
The Justice again sided with the dissenters two years later when
the Court decided in McCleskey v. Zant358 to apply the Sykes cause-
and-prejudice standard in determining whether a habeas petitioner
had "abused [the] writ" by filing a second habeas petition raising an
issue that he had not raised in his first petition." 9 The Justice joined
Justice Marshall's dissent, which criticized the Court for "radically
redefin[ing] the content of the 'abuse of the writ' doctrine" by replac-
ing the "deliberate abandonment" standard applied in such cases
under the Warren Court's precedents36 ° with the stricter cause-and-
prejudice standard. 6' Rejecting the Court's emphasis on finality, the
dissenters noted that "the very essence of the Great Writ is our crimi-
nal justice system's commitment to suspending '[c]onventional notions
of finality of litigation.., where life or liberty is at stake and infringe-
ment of constitutional rights is alleged.' "362
Finally, the Justice wrote a stinging dissent when the Court held
in Coleman v. Thompson363 that a habeas petitioner cannot possibly
satisfy the "cause" prong of the Sykes test if a procedural default oc-
curred during state postconviction proceedings, because attorney er-
ror satisfies the cause requirement only if it rises to the level of
ineffective assistance 3 64 and a defendant has no constitutional right to
effective representation during state postconviction proceedings. 65
Calling the majority's reasoning "a sleight of logic that would be ironic
356. 1& at 412-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. See id. at 416-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
358. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
359. Id. at 496.
360. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (holding that prisoners forfeit
the right to file a second habeas petition if they "deliberately withhold[ ] one of two
grounds for federal collateral relief at the time of filing [the] first application, in the hope
of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some other reason" or "deliberately
abandon[ ] one of [the] grounds at the first hearing").
361. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 517-18 (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 8).
363. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
364. See id. at 752 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 447 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)); see also supra
text accompanying notes 349-50.
365. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per
curiam), an opinion that the Justice joined).
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if not for its tragic consequences, 366 Justice Blackmun criticized the
Court for "creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and
unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights 3 67 and
for "unjustifiabl[y] elevat[ing] abstract federalism over fundamental
precepts of liberty and fairness. '3 68
The Justice also disagreed with the Coleman majority's refusal to
apply the "plain statement" rule set out in his majority opinion in
Harris v. Reed369 because the state supreme court's three-sentence
summary order dismissing the prisoner's appeal did not "'fairly ap-
pear[ ] to rest primarily on federal law."' 370 Arguing that the majority
had "wrested Harris out of the context of a preference for the vindica-
tion of fundamental constitutional rights and.., set it down in a vac-
uum of rhetoric about federalism," the Justice described the majority's
ruling as "the nadir of the Court's recent habeas jurisprudence,
[which] now routinely, and without evident reflection, subordinates
fundamental constitutional rights to mere utilitarian interests."1371
The Justice likewise voted consistently with the liberal Justices in
those cases where the Court addressed the scope of the exceptions to
the Sykes cause-and-prejudice standard. He refused to join the major-
ity in Murray v. Carrier,72 which held that a federal court may grant
habeas relief on a defaulted claim absent proof of cause only in "an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably re-
sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. '373 Instead,
he joined Justice Stevens' separate opinion, which argued that a
broader exception to the cause-and-prejudice standard should be rec-
ognized whenever "the fundamental fairness of a prisoner's conviction
is at issue."37 4
The Justice adhered to that position in a series of cases that cre-
ated an even narrower exception to the Sykes standard for capital
cases. In the first of these cases, Smith v. Murray,3 75 which was de-
cided on the same day as Murray v. Carrier,76 the majority refused to
366. Id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
368. Id at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
369. 489 U.S. 255 (1989). See supra text accompanying notes 352-54.
370. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983)).
371. Id. at 764-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
372. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
373. Id at 496.
374. Id. at 501, 506-07 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
375. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
376. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). There were actually three habeas decisions issued by the
Court that day. In the third one, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986), a plurality
Fall 1998] JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S MARK ON CRIMINAL LAW 261
recognize an exception to Sykes absent a "substantial claim that the
alleged error undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing de-
termination."37 As in Carrier, the Justice joined Justice Stevens' sep-
arate opinion, which concluded that when "a condemned prisoner
raises a substantial, colorable Eighth Amendment violation," the fed-
eral courts should consider the merits of the habeas petition despite a
procedural default if "the prisoner's claim would render his sentencing
proceeding fundamentally unfair."3 78
The Court elaborated on its ruling in Smith v. Murray three years
later, holding in Dugger v. Adams 379 that the fact that an alleged error
"might have affected the accuracy of a death sentence is far from dem-
onstrating that an individual defendant probably is 'actually innocent'
of the sentence he or she received."380 This time, Justice Blackmun
wrote the dissenting opinion himself, chiding the majority for
"send[ing] respondent to an execution that not only is presumptively
unlawful, but is presumptively inaccurate as well."38'
Finally, in Sawyer v. Whitley,382 the Court again expanded its
holding in Smith v. Murray, ruling that federal courts may not enter-
tain habeas petitions filed by death-row prisoners who are raising de-
faulted or successive claims absent "clear and convincing evidence
that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applica-
of the Court said that "the 'ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain [successive
habeas] petitions only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a col-
orable showing of factual innocence." Thus, the plurality explained, the prisoner must
show "'a fair probability"' that, in light of "all probative evidence of guilt or innocence"-
even illegally admitted evidence--" 'the trier of the facts would have entertained a reason-
able doubt of his guilt."' Id. at 455 n.17 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CIn. L. REv. 142, 160 (1970)).
Although the Justice joined the portion of the Court's opinion disposing of the case on the
merits, see supra text accompanying notes 226-28, he did not join this part of the opinion.
377. Smith, 477 U.S. at 539.
378. Id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
379. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
380. Id. at 412 n.6.
381. Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The respondent alleged that his rights under
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), had been violated when the trial judge told the
jury that he was responsible for the sentencing decision and that the jury's role was merely
advisory. The Justice noted that unlike the habeas petition in Smith v. Murray, which chal-
lenged the constitutionality of admitting certain evidence in the capital sentencing hearing,
the petition in Dugger v. Adams involved a "global" error that "necessarily pervade[d] the
entire sentencing process [and] could not help but pervert the sentencing decision." Dug-
ger, 489 U.S. at 423 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
382. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
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ble state law."'38 3 Justice Blackmun again wrote separately, criticizing
the majority's "unduly cramped view of 'actual innocence.'" 3 84 Not-
ing that the majority's "single-minded focus on actual innocence...
assumes, erroneously, that the only value worth protecting through
federal habeas review is the accuracy and reliability of the guilt deter-
mination," the Justice concluded that "[o]nly by returning to the fed-
eral courts' central and traditional function on habeas review,
evaluating claims of constitutional error, can the Court ensure that the
ends of justice are served and that fundamental miscarriages of justice
do not go unremedied. ' 315
3. Deference to the State Courts' Factfinding
The Justice was also consistently in the liberal camp in cases dis-
cussing the degree of deference owed to state court decisions in
habeas proceedings. He joined the majority's holding in Miller v. Fen-
ton38 6 that the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is not a ques-
tion of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness, 8 7 but instead is
"a legal question requiring independent federal determination. 3 8
Seven years later, when the Court was asked in Wright v.
West3 9 to reconsider Miller's more general ruling that mixed constitu-
tional questions of law and fact are "subject to plenary federal review"
on habeas, 9 ° the Justice declined to join the plurality opinion, which
seemed somewhat sympathetic to the state's suggestion that de novo
federal review of mixed questions of law and fact is inconsistent with
the Teague line of cases391 and that instead federal courts entertaining
habeas petitions should inquire only whether the state court's decision
was reasonable.3 92 Although the plurality ultimately found it unneces-
383. Id. at 336. After the Justice left the bench, the Court held in Schiup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995), that the broader Murray v. Carrier standard, see supra text accom-
panying note 372-73, rather than the stricter Sawyer v. Whitley standard, applies to habeas
petitions ified by death-row prisoners who are challenging their conviction rather than
their sentence.
384. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
385. Id at 356-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
386. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
387. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994), federal courts entertaining habeas petitions are
required to presume the correctness of a state court's "determination after a hearing on the
merits of a factual issue."
388. Miller, 474 U.S. at 110.
389. 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (plurality opinion).
390. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112.
391. For a description of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 312-21.
392. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 291-95 (plurality opinion).
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sary to resolve this issue,"93 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
O'Connor's separate opinion, warning that "a move away from de
novo review of mixed questions of law and fact would be a substantial
change in our construction of the authority conferred by the habeas
corpus statute. '394
Thus, the Justice's views on habeas seemed to undergo a signifi-
cant evolution during his time on the Court. Though initially hesitant
to apply the writ broadly, he eventually came to believe that habeas
corpus plays an important role in correcting constitutional errors and
that his more conservative colleagues' exclusive focus on the question
of factual innocence was seriously misguided.
E. The Right to Jury Trial Cases
Although the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is not one of
the rights that has received a great deal of attention in discussions of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' treatment of the Warren Court's
precedents, it is one of the criminal law topics on which the Justice
most frequently wrote. In describing the Justice's contributions to the
law in this area, I will consider the Court's opinions analyzing the
scope of the right to jury trial, the constitutionality of altering the size
of the jury or the unanimity requirement, and discrimination in the
jury-selection process.
1. The Scope of the Right to Jury Trial
In the Justice's early years on the Court, he was unwilling to give
the right to jury trial an expansive interpretation. He wrote the plu-
rality opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,395 concluding that the
states are not constitutionally obligated to provide a jury trial in juve-
nile delinquency proceedings.3 96 Noting that on its face the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to juvenile court proceedings because
they are not "criminal prosecutions," the Justice wrote that "one can-
not say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of
accurate factfinding."3 97
Likewise, the Justice dissented in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania398
from the Court's holding that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
393. See &L at 295.
394. Id. at 305-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
395. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality opinion).
396. See id. at 551.
397. Id. at 541, 543.
398. 418 U.S. 506, 522 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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applied to contempt proceedings stemming from the defendants' dis-
ruptive behavior at trial.3 99 The Justice's dissenting opinion argued
that jury trials are unnecessary in contempt proceedings arising from
behavior that took place in a courtroom because "the incident and all
its details are fully preserved on the trial record."40 Therefore, the
Justice concluded, "I am at a loss ... to see the role a jury is to per-
form" in these cases.40 1
Finally, the Justice wrote the majority opinion in Ludwig v. Mas-
sachusetts,402 finding no constitutional defect in a "two-tier" system
that initially gave defendants charged with certain crimes a bench
trial, but then afforded those who were convicted a right to trial de
novo before a jury.403 The Justice's opinion rejected the defendant's
argument that the two-tier system unconstitutionally burdened his
right to jury trial "by imposing the financial cost of an additional
trial;.., by subjecting an accused to a potentially harsher sentence if
he seeks a trial de novo in the second tier; and ... by imposing the
increased psychological and physical hardships of two trials. ' 4
Although the Justice was "not oblivious" to these concerns, he noted
that "[t]he modes of exercising federal constitutional rights have tradi-
tionally been left, within limits, to state specification" 405 and con-
cluded that the two-tier system was "fair and not unduly
burdensome. 4
6
In United Mine Workers v. Bagwell,4° 7 however, the Justice wrote
the majority opinion, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial did apply to contempt charges filed against a labor union that led
to fines of more than $52 million.408 Observing that the fines imposed
in this case were not "calibrate[d] to damages caused by the union's
contumacious activities '40 9 and therefore were not compensatory; that
399. See id. at 523 (majority opinion). The Court distinguished Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality opinion), in which it had held that there is no right to jury trial
for petty offenses, on the ground that the various contempt charges filed against the de-
fendants in Codispoti had been tried in a single proceeding after their criminal trial ended
and had resulted in a total prison sentence that greatly exceeded six months. See Codis-
pot 418 U.S. at 515-17.
400. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 522 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
402. 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
403. See id. at 632.
404. Id. at 626.
405. Id. at 628.
406. Id. at 630.
407. 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
408. See id. at 838.
409. Id. at 834.
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"[t]he union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the court's pres-
ence or otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and
adjudicate the proceedings before it;"41 and that the union's behavior
involved "widespread, ongoing, out-of-court violations of a complex
injunction"41' rather than "simple, affirmative acts, ' 412 the Justice's
majority opinion concluded that "the serious contempt fines imposed
here were criminal and constitutionally could not be imposed absent a
jury trial. '4 13
2. Jury Size and Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts
The Justice also wrote opinions in several cases discussing the
constitutional implications of reducing the size of juries and altering
the unanimous-verdict requirement. Although he joined the plurality
opinion in Apodaca v. Oregon,4 14 which concluded that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a unanimous jury verdict and therefore
upheld a scheme that required only ten votes to convict,415 he wrote a
separate concurring opinion, commenting that he did not consider the
state's practice "wise." '416 The Justice indicated that he would have
voted against it "as a matter of policy" if he had been a state legisla-
tor, but he joined the plurality opinion because he could not "con-
clude that the system is constitutionally offensive. "417
When the Court subsequently evaluated the constitutionality of
five-person juries in Ballew v. Georgia,4 18 the Justice wrote the plural-
ity opinion. Recognizing that the Court in Williams v. Florida419 had
previously approved of six-person juries on the ground that the Sixth
Amendment requires only a jury "of sufficient size to promote group
deliberation, to insulate members from outside intimidation, and to
410. Id. at 837.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 838. Describing the fine imposed here as "unquestionably... a serious
contempt sanction," the Justice saw no need to answer "the difficult question where the
line between petty and serious contempt fines should be drawn." Id at 838 n.5. The Jus-
tice therefore did not attempt to draw a precise line between Bagwell and Muniz v. Hoff-
man, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), where the Court held - in an opinion the Justice joined - that a
$10,000 fine assessed against a labor union was not "a deprivation of such magnitude" to
make the criminal contempt charge at issue there a nonpetty offense and implicate the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Id. at 477.
414. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
415. See iL at 405-06.
416. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
417. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
418. 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (plurality opinion).
419. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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provide a representative cross-section of the community," 420 the Jus-
tice distinguished Williams and concluded that the Sixth Amendment
does not permit criminal trials with juries of fewer than six mem-
bers.42' Citing a number of empirical studies that, among other things,
"suggest[ed] that progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster
effective group deliberation '42 2 and "raise[d] doubts about the accu-
racy of the results achieved by smaller and smaller panels,"423 the Jus-
tice thought that "the purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal
trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduc-
tion in size to below six members."42 4 Although he did not "pretend
to discern a clear line" between the six-person jury approved in Wil-
liams and the five-person jury at issue in Ballew, he concluded that
"[b]ecause of the fundamental importance of the jury trial to the
American system of criminal justice, any further reduction that pro-
motes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes un-
toward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly
representing their communities, attains constitutional significance." 4'
3. Discrimination in Selecting Juries
As is evident from the Justice's opinion in Ballew, he was strongly
committed to fair jury-selection procedures. That commitment was
apparent from his early years on the Court, and he took an active role
in trying to put an end to discriminatory jury-selection practices. He
agreed with the majority's holding in Taylor v. Louisiana426 that "the
systematic exclusion of women from jury panels"'427 violates "an es-
sential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial"4 2 -
namely, the right to have the jury selected from "a representative
cross section of the community."429 The Justice likewise joined the
majority opinion in Duren v. Missouri,43 which struck down a state
420. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 230 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 100).
421. See id. at 239.
422. Id. at 232.
423. Id. at 234.
424. Id. at 239. It was the Justice's detailed discussion of these empirical studies that
reportedly led all but Justice Stevens to refuse to sign his opinion, even though each of the
nine Justices had agreed with the result in conference. See Jenkins, supra note 9, at 20.
425. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239. Not surprisingly, the Justice joined the majority opinion
issued the following year in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979), which held that
the Sixth Amendment does not permit convictions by nonunanimous six-person juries.
426. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
427. Id. at 522.
428. Id. at 528.
429. Id.
430. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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statute that exempted women from jury service on request as violative
of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement.431
The Justice wrote for the majority in two important cases dealing
with discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. In the first case,
Castaneda v. Partida,432 the Justice's majority opinion concluded that
the defendant had established a prima facie case of intentional dis-
crimination, and the state had failed to rebut that inference of discrim-
ination, where a "key man" system that relied on jury commissioners
to select prospective grand jurors had resulted in gross under-
representation of the county's Latino community.433
In the second case, Rose v. Mitchell,434 the Court held that de-
fendants may allege discrimination in the selection of grand jury mem-
bers when challenging their convictions on habeas, even though they
were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury that satisfied
the fair cross-section requirement. 3 Reasoning that "discrimination
on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury...
strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our soci-
ety as a whole," the Justice wrote that "we ... cannot deny that...
racial and other forms of discrimination"-though "[p]erhaps .. .
more subtle than before"-are "no less real or pernicious" and "still
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as
a whole. '4 36
Likewise, the Justice played an active role in the Supreme Court
cases discussing the constitutional implications of a litigant's exercise
of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. He
joined the majority in Batson v. Kentucky,437 which struck down a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Ameri-
cans from criminal juries as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.438 He also agreed when the Court voted to give white defend-
ants standing to raise Batson challenges 439 and to extend Batson to
prohibit private litigants in civil cases from using their peremptory
431. See id. at 370.
432. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
433. See id2 at 500-01. Although 79.1% of the people living in the county were Mexi-
can-Americans, only 39% of those who had been summoned for grand jury service over an
11-year period were Mexican-American. See id at 495.
434. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
435. See idL at 564-65.
436. Ld. at 556. The Justice thought, however, that the defendants had failed to make
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See id. at 564-74.
437. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
438. See iL at 89.
439. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
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challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion." 0 Furthermore, he
sided with the dissenters in each of the two instances where the major-
ity rejected similar challenges: first, in Holland v. Illinois,41 when the
majority held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to ex-
clude African-Americans did not violate a white defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury;442 and then in Hernandez v.
New York,443 where the majority found no Batson violation in pe-
remptorily excluding Latino jurors because "they might have difficulty
in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish-language
testimony."4'
In addition, the Justice wrote the majority opinion in two cases
that extended the ruling in Batson. In the first case, Georgia v. Mc-
Collum,445 the Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
criminal defendants from exercising their peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory fashion." 6 Rejecting the defendants' argument
that their use of peremptory challenges did not constitute state ac-
tion," 7 the Justice considered it "an affront to justice to argue that a
fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens
based upon their race.""
In the second case, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. ,44 the Justice
wrote for the majority in extending Batson to forbid the use of per-
emptory challenges to exclude women from juries. 450 Refusing to
draw a distinction between race and gender, and finding it unneces-
sary to determine "whether women or racial minorities have suffered
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of
our nation's history, ' 45 1 the Justice reasoned that "gender, like race, is
440. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
441. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
442. See i&L at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
443. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
444. Id. at 361. The Justice dissented, "essentially" agreeing with Justice Stevens, see id.
at 375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), to reject the prosecutor's purported justification because
it "would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification of Spanish-speaking
venirepersons," it "could easily have been accommodated by less drastic means," and, if
"valid and substantiated by the record, it would have supported a challenge for cause." IL
at 379 (Steven, J., dissenting).
445. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
446. See id. at 59.
447. See id. at 50-55.
448. lId at 57.
449. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
450. See id. at 146.
451. Id. at 136.
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an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."4"2
The Justice's opinion closes with a stirring indictment of discrimina-
tion in the jury-selection process:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of
justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only fur-
thers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of
equality under the law-that all citizens, regardless of race,
ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our
democracy.... When persons are excluded from participation
in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender,
this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial
system is jeopardized.4 "3
Although the Justice wrote these words during his last Term, he
was an equally strong advocate of fair jury-selection processes
throughout his entire tenure on the Court. At times he was reluctant
to extend the right to jury trial to different settings, but in those cases
where a jury was required, he was committed to ensuring that it was
constituted in a way that would ensure a fair trial and a fair represen-
tation of the community.
Hm. Conclusion
Any discussion of the record of a jurist who served with such dis-
tinction for so many years on a court whose docket contains so many
criminal cases must necessarily be somewhat selective. Thus, I have
failed to mention some of the criminal cases in which Justice Black-
mun wrote for the majority4 54 not because I view them as unimpor-
452. Id. at 129.
453. Id. at 145-46.
454. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (concluding that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines applies to drug-related forfeitures of
property under federal statute); Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993) (holding
that federal rules do not permit trying a defendant who is absent at the beginning of trial in
absentia); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989) (finding violation of Double
Jeopardy Clause when government imposes civil penalty bearing no rational relation to its
loss on someone who has already been convicted), overruled by Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93 (1997); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding federal
sentencing guidelines in the face of separation-of-powers and delegation-doctrine chal-
lenges); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 747 (1987) (permitting exclusion of criminal
defendant from hearing to determine competency of two child witnesses); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (holding that prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory
evidence to the defendant constitutes reversible error only if it is reasonably probable that
the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed); Con-
necticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1983) (plurality opinion) (concluding that jury in-
struction creating conclusive presumption that one intends the natural and necessary
consequences of one's actions can never constitute harmless error); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 143 (1980) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to federal stat-
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tant, but instead because I have chosen to focus on two issues in
assessing the Justice's mark on criminal law and procedure: first, the
Justice's judicial personality, as reflected in the opinions he wrote in
criminal cases, and second, the role he played in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' well-publicized narrowing of the rights accorded
criminal defendants. With respect to the first issue, it is quite appar-
ent that the Justice showed the same humility, careful attention to the
facts of each case, and concern for the real-world impact of the
Court's decisions in his criminal jurisprudence as he did in other areas.
Although the second issue is more debatable, it is clear that the Justice
did not remain as loyal to a "law and order" platform as President
Nixon and the legal pundits might have predicted. At the same time,
he did not align himself as closely with Justices Brennan and Marshall
in criminal cases as he did in other areas. But whether it was the Jus-
tice whose views changed or the Court that changed around him, his
votes and writings in criminal cases-most notably those involving
habeas petitions and the right to a fairly selected jury-were often
surprisingly protective of the rights of criminal defendants for a Jus-
tice nominated at a time when crime control was of such paramount
concern.
ute that permitted prosecution to appeal sentences imposed on dangerous special offend-
ers); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,77 (1980) (finding that admission of unavailable witness'
preliminary hearing testimony at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 696 (1975) (interpreting federal statutes that prohibit assault-
ing federal officials and conspiring to assault federal officials not to require proof that the
defendant was aware of the victim's identity); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729-30
(1972) (striking down state statute that authorized the commitment of defendants found
incompetent to stand trial without requiring the same procedures and standards applied in
other cases of involuntary commitment).
